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Swansea University
NILQ 66(3): 199–221
Abstract 
This article is a critique of  the recent judgments of  the Irish Supreme Court on the subject of  bilingual
juries in Ireland. By ruling that to allow Irish speakers to be tried by a jury that speaks Irish would be
unconstitutional, despite the constitutional status of  the Irish language as a national and the first language
of  the state, it has undermined the bilingualism of  the Irish state and betrayed the principal function of  the
state that the founders had envisaged. The article argues that the issue of  bilingual juries in Ireland has left
the state on a crossroads, but in a position where it must act. It concludes by offering two alternatives: either
to abandon its commitment to bilingualism or to honour it fully.2
Introduction
What is a bilingual state? What does the status of  a ‘national language’ mean, and inwhat contexts can the citizen interact or be denied interaction with the state and its
institutions, especially its legal system, through the medium of  a national language?
Specifically, should the citizen charged with a criminal offence have the right to be tried
through the medium of  the national language by a tribunal competent in that language?
These were some of  the questions that confronted the Supreme Court of  Ireland in
Ó Maicín v Ireland.3
These were the facts. The appellant, a native of  Rosmuc in Connemara, County Galway,
was charged with committing an assault and producing an offensive weapon. He was to
stand trial at Galway Circuit Criminal Court for these offences. Both alleged assailant and
victim were native Irish speakers. The incident occurred and was to be tried in an area where
the most recent census figures show that the language enjoys extensive everyday use by
significant numbers of  the population and is within the competence of  the majority of  the
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population.4 The appellant wished to present his defence in Irish and to have his case heard
by a bilingual jury, that is, a jury who were sufficiently competent in Irish to hear the case
without the assistance of  a translator or interpreter. He asked that a jury district consisting
of  bilingual citizens capable of  serving on a bilingual jury be created, or some alternative
administrative arrangement whereby 12 jurors could be randomly selected from a list of
bilingual citizens. 
The appellant’s argument was that he was constitutionally entitled to be tried by a
tribunal which spoke the national and first language of  the state. He was not arguing that
he should to be tried by an Irish-speaking jury in order to have a fair trial. No doubt, the
quality of  the process would be better if  he were tried by a tribunal that spoke and
understood his language without interpretation. But that was not the basis of  his
submission. Neither was he asking for special provisions to be in place in the cause of
compassion, inclusivity, diversity or some other humane consideration. His case was that he
was an Irish speaker in a sovereign state whose constitution recognises the Irish language as
the national and first official language and, accordingly, he had a right to be tried by a
tribunal, that is, a judge and jury who spoke his language. 
The Supreme Court of  Ireland rejected his application and ruled that a bilingual jury
would be unconstitutional. That judgment is one whose significance transcends criminal
justice issues, such as trial fairness or due process. Its relevance for criminal process is in
many ways secondary. Its true significance is that it challenges a particular sovereign state’s
commitment to constitutional bilingualism. This article’s purpose, in light of  the judgment
in Ó Maicín, is to determine, as a matter of  constitutional principle and practice, whether or
not the Irish state is a bilingual state.
Justice in the bilingual state: a paradigm
Bilingualism is a linguistic term whose meaning is derived from the Latin for ‘two tongues’,
that is, two languages.5 Bilingualism as a human phenomenon manifests itself  at several
levels, from the individual or familial to the communal, regional or national.6 State
bilingualism is a form of  societal bilingualism, in that it concerns bilingualism in its
collective meaning. But a bilingual state does not necessarily consist of  individuals who are
all fluent in both languages of  the state. Indeed, the global norm is for individual
bilingualism to be a trait of  the minority in any given society.7
This is not an essay in socio-linguistics: it does not explore the cognitive or typological
definitions of  bilingualism. The question that this paper poses is, what is the bilingual state?
This expression, bilingual state, is not a legal or constitutional term of  art. However, there
are states which are bilingual and whose bilingualism is a keystone in their constitutions.
These provide us with paradigms of  a bilingual state.8 Modern Finland, for example, was
established as a bilingual state, Finnish and Swedish, by the founding constitution of  1919.9
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However, the overwhelming majority of  the population speak Finnish only. The minority
who speak Swedish also mostly speak Finnish and so, on an individual level, are bilingual.10
But the linguistic demographics are irrelevant to Finland’s constitutional status as a bilingual
state.11 The constitution of  the state guarantees the right to language and culture, declares
Finnish and Swedish to be the national languages of  the state, and guarantees the right to
use either language in the courts and to receive official documents in either language. Both
languages are treated by law on an equal basis.12
Giving further effect to these constitutional rights are the provisions of  the Language
Act 2003, which confirms the equal status of  both languages as national languages.13
Section 14 of  the Act deals with the language of  criminal proceedings and provides that the
national language of  the defendant is used as the language of  those proceedings. In
situations where there are several defendants who speak different languages, or a language
other than the national languages, the court determines the language of  the proceedings
‘with regard to the rights and interests of  the parties’.14 But the first principle which the law
upholds is that the language of  the defendant shall be the language of  the proceedings,
which means that, not only has the defendant the right to use his or her national language,
but the defendant will also be tried by a tribunal which speaks that language. Finland, of
course, is not a common law jurisdiction and the particular issues and dilemmas that arise
in the context of  jury trials do not apply there. We must therefore look for a better
precedent. 
Perhaps the archetypal bilingual state in the common law world, and therefore the most
appropriate model for comparison, is Canada. Canada’s federal bilingualism is entrenched
in its constitution and is given further meaning in legislation. In summary, Canada regards
English and French as official languages of  equal status.15 The origin of  Canadian
bilingualism can be found in the British North America Act of  1867 which established the
Canadian confederacy and gave dominion status for Canada.16 Although the Act did not
establish Canada as a bilingual state at the outset, it gave the right to use either English or
French in debates in the Canadian Parliament and the legislature of  Quebec, the right to use
either language in certain courts and legal proceedings established by Parliament, and in
Quebec, and ensured that legislation published by the Canadian Parliament and the
legislature of  Quebec would be bilingual. The Act formed the basis of  the Canadian
Constitution until 1982, when it was redesignated the Constitution Act 1867 and
incorporated into Canada’s Constitution Act of  1982.17
The Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms is the key instrument in the country’s
modern constitution, forming the first part of  the Constitution Act of  1982. It confirms
the official bilingualism of  Canada as a federal state and the bilingualism of  the province of
New Brunswick. Section 16 of  the Charter declares that English and French are official
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languages and have equality of  status and equal rights and privileges. Furthermore, s 19 of
the Charter states that, ‘either English or French may be used by any person in, or in any
pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by Parliament’. Giving effect to
the phrase ‘equality of  status and equal rights’ is the Official Languages Act (Canada) 1988.
Section 2 of  the Act states that the purpose of  the legislation is to:
(a) ensure respect for English and French as the official languages of  Canada
and ensure equality of  status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in
all federal institutions, in particular with respect to their use in parliamentary
proceedings, in legislative and other instruments, in the administration of
justice, in communicating with or providing services to the public and in
carrying out the work of  federal institutions; 
(b) support the development of  English and French linguistic minority
communities and generally advance the equality of  status and use of  the
English and French languages within Canadian society; and 
(c) set out the powers, duties and functions of  federal institutions with respect
to the official languages of  Canada.
Equality is a keyword in this Act and it is this Act which turns the broad constitutional
principles into practical legal rights. The preamble emphasises the guiding values that
‘English and French are the official languages of  Canada and have equality of  status and
equal rights’ and underlines the commitment of  the government of  Canada ‘to enhancing
the vitality and supporting the development of  English and French linguistic minority
communities, as and to fostering full recognition and use of  English and French in
Canadian society’.18 The government of  the Canadian state is the guarantor of  the
development and maintenance of  bilingualism. It is not a passive or an indifferent role. Not
only is linguistic equality a key constitutional principle, it is clear that it is the business of
the state, through its government, to safeguard and support Canada’s bilingualism and to
work with the provinces to achieve this. The Act’s detailed provisions set out how
bilingualism is given effect and, among other things, define the role and function of  the
Commissioner of  Official Languages in implementing and promoting language rights.19
This Act, in addition to confirming the right to use either French or English in the Canadian
federal courts20 and the duty of  federal courts to ensure that any person giving evidence in
his or her chosen official language is not placed at a disadvantage by doing so,21 gives parties
in the federal court the right to a tribunal which speaks their official language.22
In the context of  criminal jury trials, the right to a tribunal which speaks one of  the
official languages is given further manifestation by the Canadian Criminal Code which
applies in all the federal criminal courts throughout Canada. The Code gives accused
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18 Official Languages Act 1988, Preamble. 
19 Ibid ss 49–81. 
20 Ibid s 14: ‘English and French are the official languages of  the federal courts, and either of  those languages
may be used by any person in, or in any pleading in or process issuing from, any federal court.’
21 Ibid s 15(1). 
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persons the right to a trial before a judge and jury who speak their official language.23 The
Supreme Court explained the meaning of  this provision in its judgment in R v Beaulac.24 It
held that language rights are distinctive constitutional rights that are wholly independent of
other legal principles or values, such as the right to a fair trial or the right to give evidence
and to be understood by a court of  law. Bilingualism is an intrinsic value that is enshrined
in the constitution and in the law of  the state. The right to be tried by a jury who speak the
accused’s official language derives primarily from the constitution of  the state, the meaning
of  Canadian citizenship and the state’s commitment to bilingualism rather than criminal
process principles, such as trial fairness or best evidence considerations. 
To implement this constitutional right, provinces have created slightly different
mechanisms to summon jurors who speak one or both of  the official languages. This is
because the language demography of  Canada is such that, with the exception of  Quebec,
French is spoken by a minority in all the provinces. Only a minority of  the Canadian
population are individually bilingual, that is, both English and French speaking.25 However,
although both the numbers and percentages of  French speakers are low in certain
provinces, all provinces are bound by law and by the constitution to ensure that an accused
can be tried by a tribunal that speaks his or her official language. 
To give a few examples, in provinces such as Alberta26 or Saskatchewan,27 where
approximately 2 per cent of  the population are French speakers, or about 61,000 and
20,000 respectively, there exist administrative arrangements whereby a list of  French
speakers is created. In a criminal trial in those provinces where the accused speaks French,
jurors are randomly selected from that list. In Ontario, where about 600,000 speak French,
the register of  jurors is divided into three parts: those who speak only French; those who
speak only English; and those who are bilingual.28 As with most common law jurisdictions,
jurors are randomly selected from the appropriate list to ensure independence and
impartiality. If  the number of  those who speak the accused’s official language is so small
that the summoning of  an independent and impartial jury is difficult, the court can transfer
the trial to a venue where there is a higher number of  people in the population who speak
the accused’s language.29
In Canada, the right to be tried by a jury who speak an official language is absolute
because the state treats both official languages on a basis of  equality, regardless of  linguistic
demography, in the administration of  justice. Moreover, there are tried and tested
mechanisms to ensure that this is done, even in provinces where the numbers who speak
the defendant’s official language are low. These mechanisms, although necessarily requiring
jury selection from what is sometimes a small percentage of  the general population, achieve
the key objective of  empanelling a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. After all,
the chances of  empanelling a competent, independent and impartial tribunal of  12 people
from a population of  60,000 is not statistically significantly less probable than if  the
population was 600,000. And in the quarter of  a century since these processes were devised
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23 See the Criminal Code of  Canada, s 530: ‘On application by an accused whose language is one of  the official
languages of  Canada . . . the accused [shall] be tried before a justice of  the peace, provincial court judge, judge
or judge and jury, as the case may be, who speak the official language of  Canada that is the language of  the
accused or, if  the circumstances warrant, who speak both official languages of  Canada.’
24 R v Beaulac [1999] 1 SCR 768.
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26 See Jury Act (Alberta) 2000.
27 See Jury Act (Saskatchewan) 1998. 
28 See Juries Act (Ontario) 1990, ss 7–8. 
29 See Criminal Code of  Canada, s 531.
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and in the years since they have been implemented, the criminal justice system of  Canada
has, apparently, not come to a grinding halt. 
The legal status of the Irish language
The present constitutional and legal status of  the Irish language in the Republic of  Ireland
owes its origins to Irish independence: the fact that Irish is an official language of  an
independent, sovereign state is fundamental to this discussion. Independence for the 26
counties of  the island of  Ireland, established by the Irish Free State (Constitution) Act
1922, heralded cultural as much as political emancipation. Article 4 of  the constitution of
1922 made Irish the national language and English ‘equally recognised as an official
language’. This meant that, despite the slightly ambivalent phrasing on the status of  English,
this was to be a bilingual state. Under British rule, the Irish language had been outlawed as
a language of  law and justice by virtue of  the Administration of  Justice (Language) Act
(Ireland) 1737, which required the business of  the courts to be conducted in English only.30
This Act of  the British Parliament, which had thus made English the sole language of
justice in Ireland, represented a position which was to continue until Irish independence.
One of  the first tasks of  the newly established Irish state was to repeal this Act. 
The 1737 Act, however, remains in force in Northern Ireland (the creation of  the
Government of  Ireland Act 1920), which, of  course, voted itself  out of  the Irish Free State
in 1922 in order to remain in the UK.31 That the 1737 Act is alive and well on the statute
book in Northern Ireland and that its discriminatory effect on Irish speakers does not
offend Article 14 of  the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) are judicial
findings that have been upheld by the Court of  Appeal in Northern Ireland in recent
times.32
Irish is thus spoken by a significant number of  the people of  Northern Ireland but does
not enjoy official status in Northern Ireland and there is no domestic legislation for its
promotion or protection.33 There is no legal right to use the Irish language in court
proceedings in Northern Ireland, for example. Before the advent of  the constitutional
changes of  the late 1990s, any prospect for laws recognising Irish language rights in
Northern Ireland seemed dead in the political water.34 However, under the terms of  the
Belfast Agreement of  1998, the policy ground began to shift when the UK recognised a
responsibility for respecting linguistic diversity, including, specifically, Irish and Ulster Scots
in Northern Ireland.35 This was to be followed by the St Andrews Agreement in 2006, when
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30 S 1: ‘All proceedings in courts of  justice, patents, charters, pardons, commissions, &c. shall be in English and
in legible character, not in court-hand, and with usual abbreviations in English.’
31 For the language policy of  Northern Ireland post-partition, see, generally, Thomas Hennessey, A History of
Northern Ireland 1920–1996 (Macmillan 1997). 
32 See Mac Giolla Cathain v the Northern Ireland Court Service [2010] NICA 24.
33 For further observations on the social and political significance of  the Irish language in Northern Ireland, see
Aodán Mac Póilin (ed), The Irish Language in Northern Ireland (Ultach Trust 1997).
34 Camille O’Reilly argues that support for the Irish language in Northern Ireland occurs in the context of  three
discourses or perspectives which she labels as decolonizing, cultural and rights discourses. The three reflect
different interpretations of  the issue: see Camille O’Reilly, The Irish Language in Northern Ireland: The Politics of
Culture and Identity (Macmillan 1999).
35 ‘All participants recognise the importance of  respect, understanding and tolerance in relation to linguistic
diversity, including in Northern Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of  the various
ethnic communities, all of  which are part of  the cultural wealth of  the island of  Ireland.’: Belfast Agreement
24. <www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement>
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the British government undertook to introduce legislation for the Irish language and to
work with the Northern Ireland Executive in protecting and developing it.36
Contemporaneously with these domestic initiatives, the UK also ratified the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in respect of  both of  the native
languages of  Northern Ireland as a further step towards implementing its commitment to
linguistic diversity.37 The regional or minority languages protected under the Charter within
the UK are Irish, Welsh, Scottish Gaelic, Scots, Manx, Ulster Scots and Cornish. All these
languages enjoy the protection of  the Charter’s general principles, specified in pt II,
Article 7 of  the Charter. Irish, Welsh, and Scottish Gaelic are also protected under the
articles contained in pt III of  the Charter, which are more detailed and which list specific
measures that are undertaken to protect a minority or regional language.38 Protection under
pt III is a matter for the state party to decide, taking into account the circumstances of  the
relevant minority or regional language and the extent to which it is used.39
Despite these encouraging initiatives, the Belfast and St Andrews Agreements, and
indeed the ECRML, have had little impact hitherto on improving the position of  the Irish
language in Northern Ireland. In the fourth and most recent cycle of  monitoring and in
periodical reports on the implementation of  the ECRML in the UK,40 in the context of
Northern Ireland, the documents make for depressing reading. The Committee of  Experts’
report, noting that competence for language policy is mainly devolved, remarked that
disagreements and discord on the language issue within the power-sharing Executive in
Northern Ireland meant that ‘it was again not possible to agree within the Executive on the
relevant text to be included in the report’.41 The report, although recognising the
Committee of  Experts’ difficulty in obtaining a clear impression of  the position in
Northern Ireland, nevertheless concluded ‘that legislation is needed for the protection of
the Irish language’.42 This key recommendation was subsequently adopted by the
Committee of  Ministers which recommended the adoption and implementation of  a
‘comprehensive Irish language policy, preferably through the adoption of  legislation
providing statutory rights for the Irish speakers’.43 In the interests of  parity and balance, it
also recommended the strengthening of  ‘work done by the Ulster Scots Agency and [to]
take measures to establish the teaching of  Ulster Scots’.44
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36 St Andrews Agreement, 2006, Annex B, ‘Human Rights, Equality, Victims and Other Issues’. 
37 ECRML, Strasbourg: Council of  Europe, 5 November 1992. The ECRML was ratified by the UK on 27
March 2001.
38 ECRML, Explanatory Report, paras 38–51. For commentary, see Jean-Marie Woehrling, The European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages: A Critical Commentary (Council of  Europe Publishing 2005) 72–81. 
39 See Woehrling (n 38) 81; also José Manuel Pérez Fernández, ‘Article 2. Undertakings and Article 3. Practical
Arrangements’ in Alba Nogueira López, Eduardo J Ruiz Vieytez and Inigo Urrutia Libanora (eds), Shaping
Language Rights (Council of  Europe Publishing 2012) 121–44. 
40 In accordance with ECRML, Article 15.
41 Report of  the Committee of  Experts on the Application of  the Charter in the United Kingdom Adopted by the Committee of
Experts on 21 June 2013 and Presented to the Committee of  Ministers of  the Council of  Europe in Accordance with Article
16 of  the Charter, paras 12–13. See also paras 205–270 for detail. <www.coe.int/t/dg4/
education/minlang/Report/EvaluationReports/UKECRML4_en.pdf>
42 Ibid para 14. 
43 Recommendation CM/RecChL(2014)3 of  the Committee of  Ministers on the Application of  the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages by the United Kingdom (Adopted by the Committee of  Ministers on 15 January 2014 at the
1188th meeting of  the Ministers’ Deputies) para 2. <www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/Report/
Recommendations/UKCMRec4_en.pdf>
44 Ibid para 4. 
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Recently, the Northern Ireland government’s Culture Minister has attempted to
implement the Council of  Ministers’ recommendation by proposing legislation that would
give rights to Irish speakers and promote the use of  the language.45 Inspired by language
legislation in Wales and Scotland, the consultation document proposed, among other things:
granting official status for the Irish language; allowing its use in the Northern Ireland
Assembly, the courts of  law and by other public bodies; ensuring its place within the
education curriculum; establishing the office of  an Irish language commissioner; and the
recognition of  Gaeltacht areas.46 The political narrative was revealing, with a deliberate
attempt to de-sectarianise the language by emphasising the fact that ‘the Irish language is
not the preserve of  any particular group or of  any section of  the community; it is part of
our shared cultural heritage and it belongs to everyone’.47
It is a vision that is unlikely to be universally shared in Northern Ireland.48 That should
not surprise us.49 Despite the progressive tone of  recent political dialogue and the growth
in the nomenclature of  human rights and multiculturalism, the harsh truth remains that ‘the
issue of  language is one which both reflects and inflames the ethnic divisions prevalent
within Northern Irish society’.50 Irish speakers in Northern Ireland are predominantly
Catholic and, in the eyes of  many in the Protestant community, the language continues to
symbolise ‘the linguistic expression of  a cultural tradition and a political enterprise that are
both profoundly alien’.51
However, the position in the Republic of  Ireland is, or at least ought to be, very
different.52 Irish in the Republic of  Ireland is not protected by the ECRML because,
although it is a minority language de facto, it is an official language of  the state.53 After all,
the Irish Constitution of  1922 recognised Irish as the national language of  the new state.
Then, with the 1937 constitution, the primary status of  the Irish language was further
entrenched, so that Article 8 of  the Constitution of  Ireland declared that:
1. The Irish language as the national language is the first official language.
2. The English language is recognised as a second official language.
3. Provision may, however, be made by law for the exclusive use of  either of  the
said languages for any one or more official purposes, either throughout the
State or in any part thereof.54
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(3)
45 <www.northernireland.gov.uk/index/media-centre/news-departments/news-dcal/news-dcal-100215-the-
irish-language.htm>
46 Proposals for an Irish Language Bill: A Consultation Document (Department of  Culture, Arts and Leisure, February
2015). 
47 See Belfast Telegraph, 10 February 2015.
48 The politicisation of  the Irish language and its ideological significance during the troubles is the subject of  a
detailed study by Diarmait Mac Giolla Chriost, The Irish Language, Symbolic Power and Political Violence in Northern
Ireland 1972–2008 (University of  Wales Press 2012).
49 See Gearóid Ó Tuathaigh, ‘Language, Ideology and National Identity’ in Joe Cleary and Claire Connolly (eds),
The Cambridge Companion to Modern Irish Culture (CUP 2005) 42–58, 56: ‘Within Northern Ireland the status and
significance of  the Irish language (and, in a more complex manner, of  Ulster Scots) remains an issue of  real
political significance.’ 
50 See Colin Coulter, Contemporary Northern Irish Society (Pluto Press 1999) 26. 
51 Ibid 27. 
52 The contrast in the fortunes of  Irish in the Republic of  Ireland compared with that of  Northern Ireland is
also discussed by Seán Hutton, ‘Notes on the Novel in Irish’ in Eamonn Hughes (ed), Culture and Politics in
Northern Ireland 1960–1990 (Open University Press 1991) 119–37. 
53 ECRML, Article 1.a.ii.
54 Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of  Ireland) 1937, Article 8. 
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The Irish Constitution’s commitment to upholding the status of  the Irish language as the
nation’s first language and thus giving it constitutional precedence over English should, no
doubt, be understood in the context of  the bloody and bitter struggle for independence
which, in the 1930s, was well within living memory.55 However, it must also be recognised
that the restoration of  the dignity and standing of  the Irish language was at the intellectual
heart of  the struggle for independence and located deep in the psyche of  the Irish
nationalism movement.56
After all, the raison d’être or mission of  the Irish state was to provide the Irish people
with a homeland where their language, culture and way of  life would flourish in direct
contrast to their experiences under foreign rule.57 Language was and is a powerful
determinant of  nationhood and a marker of  the organic, historical nation.58 The Irish
language is therefore, in anthropological terms, proof  that the Irish nation is not a political
contrivance. As the 1937 constitution’s chief  architect remarked, the Irish language ‘is an
essential part of  our nationhood’.59 The independence movement was thus driven by a
desire to liberate the Irish nation from the injustices and insults of  foreign rule. As the
Irish language had been downtrodden by the British, so it would be exalted by the Irish
state.60 Whatever may have been the political or psychological motives behind the
enthronement of  Irish as first official language, the legal implication was to establish
Ireland as a bilingual country. 
If  the creation of  the Irish state promised an upturn in the official fortunes of  the Irish
language, as a living, daily spoken language, circumstances were less promising. Irish had
suffered a rapid decline in the numbers of  its speakers in the aftermath of  the famine in the
middle of  the nineteenth century, although the genesis of  the decline may be traced back
to the seventeenth if  not the sixteenth century.61 The reversal of  this decline was something
which the Irish state, at least initially, seemed eager to remedy, inheriting the efforts of  the
Gaelic League a generation earlier.62 Gaelicisation was thus the state’s policy of  reviving the
national language, with a particular emphasis on, and possibly undue faith in, Irish medium
school education as the appropriate organ for achieving this objective.63 Of  course,
Gaelicisation was never an exercise in language displacement or an attempt to drive out
English and replace it with Irish. It was in fact an attempt to create citizens that could speak
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59 See Eamon de Valera, ‘Language and the Irish Nation’, speech broadcast on Radio Eireann, 17 March 1943.
60 See Paul Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism 1912–1916 (Clarendon Press
1994) 84–5. 
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as being one of  them. See Ó Tuathaigh (n 49) 48: ‘The Irish continued to insist that they were a distinct nation,
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62 Ibid 48. 
63 R F Foster, Modern Ireland 1600–1972 (Allen Lane 1988)  546: ‘The approach was tacitly recognised as
unsuccessful by everyone who had anything to do with it, though education ministers and Gaelic League
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both languages of  the state.64 Other strategies included the designation of  Irish-speaking
areas as protected Gaeltacht areas, a policy which paradoxically may have entrenched the
general perception that Irish was a dying language and that the Gaeltacht areas were no more
than enclaves or reservations for a dying culture.65
Promoting the national language as first official language of  the state also had some
impact, albeit piecemeal, on the administration of  justice. The Legal Practitioners
(Qualification) Act 1929, for example, required Irish barristers and solicitors to have
competent knowledge of  the Irish language and, in the same vein, the Courts of  Justice Act
1924 required certain members of  the judiciary to have command of  the language.66
Section 44 of  the 1924 Act made it a requirement, as far it was practicable in the
circumstances, to assign circuit judges with knowledge of  Irish to courts where Irish was in
general use so that justice could be dispensed without the judge relying on an interpreter.67
But it was Kennedy CJ, the first Chief  Justice of  the liberated Ireland, in Ó Foghludha v
McClean who gave the clearest expression to the meaning of  the Irish language’s
constitutional status, and the state’s duty towards it:
The declaration by the Constitution that the National language of  the Saorstát is
the Irish language does not mean the Irish language, is or was at that historical
moment, universally spoken by the People of  the Saorstát, which would be
untrue in fact, but it did mean that it is the historic distinctive speech of  the Irish
people, that it is to rank as such in the nation, and, by implication, that the State
is bound to do everything within its sphere of  action . . . to establish and
maintain it in its status as the National language . . . none of  the organs of  the
State, legislative, executive or judicial may derogate from the pre-eminent status
of  the Irish language as the national language of  the State without offending
against the Constitutional position.68
Yet, despite this robust constitutional affirmation and the revivalist agenda initiated at the
dawn of  Irish independence, the twentieth century, as it unfolded, saw continued decline in
the Irish language as a daily spoken language.69 Census figures for 2011 showed that the
population of  the Irish state was 4,581,269.70 According to the official figures, about 1.77m
could speak Irish, a figure which equated to about 41.1 per cent of  the population. This, at
first glance, appeared quite encouraging. However, of  these only 82,600 (1.8 per cent) spoke
Irish daily, 110,642 weekly and 613,236 occasionally outside the school classroom. Detailed
regional analysis showed areas where the language had particular strength, such as Gaeltacht
districts, of  which Connemara is one, where 96,628, or 68.5 per cent, could speak Irish. 
Why did not the exalted constitutional status of  Irish inspire its revival? Whereas the
language was granted high status by the constitution, little was done by the state to
implement bilingualism in everyday life. There was a complete disconnection between the
declared constitutional principle and its practical implementation. Irish language policy thus
descended into a series of  empty gestures and ritualistic use in the spirit of  tokenism.
Despite the requirement of  competence among lawyers practising in the courts of  law, Irish
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68 Per Kennedy CJ in Ó Foghludha v McClean (1934) IR 469. 
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was seldom heard and rarely taken seriously.71 The state’s constitutional obligation to
provide Irish versions of  legislation in accordance with Article 25 went into suspension in
the 1980s.72 This meant that only English versions were being drafted, a state of  affairs
which the Irish Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional and which was later remedied.73
At least one of  the principal reasons for the disconnection between principle and
practice was due to the fact that ‘the constitutional status of  Irish was not translated into
statutory legal rights for Irish speakers’.74 After much prevarication, recognition of  this
fundamental flaw in the constitutional architecture led to remedial legislation for the Irish
language. The Official Languages Act (Ireland) 2003 appears to draw much of  its
inspiration from the Welsh Language Act (UK) 1993, in that its mechanism for promoting
the use of  the Irish language is to require public bodies to prepare policy schemes to
provide services through the medium of  Irish.75 The phrase official languages in the title
of  the Act is somewhat misleading because the principal concern is Irish – it has little
interest in protecting or promoting English, which probably does not need protecting or
promoting. Irish language schemes are approved by a designated government minister and
are subject to three-yearly reviews. The Act is the first concerted attempt in legislation to
create a mechanism for implementing bilingualism in Ireland. 
The Official Languages Act also establishes the office of  Irish Language Commissioner
whose chief  function is to monitor and ensure compliance by public bodies with the
Official Languages Act and their duties thereunder.76 However, the role of  the Irish
Language Commissioner in Ireland seems to have hitherto proved frustrating and thankless.
In 2014, the postholder resigned over what he felt were the blatant failures of  the Irish
government to promote the language and ensure that the public bodies which it funded
complied with the provisions of  the Act.77 Indeed, he warned that the Irish state’s policy
on the Irish language was in jeopardy of  becoming ‘a sham’ unless the state could guarantee
an absolute right to deal with its departments through the medium of  Irish and, to achieve
this, build the capacity to deliver services in Irish by having sufficient numbers of  Irish-
speaking administrators.78
The Official Languages Act contains provisions dealing with Irish in law-making and in
the conduct of  legal proceedings. Section 7 requires the publication of  legislation
simultaneously in Irish and English (reinforcing the constitutional provision). Section 8
grants the right to use either Irish or English in court proceedings, and ‘that in being so
heard the person will not be placed at a disadvantage by not being heard in the other official
language’.79 If  the cause of  bilingual juries in Ireland seems at first glance to have found its
statutory champion, hope is quickly dashed with the following sub-section which provides
that disadvantage can be averted through the use of  simultaneous or consecutive
interpretation of  the proceedings.80
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Lest anyone should believe that this represents a special or distinctive arrangement in
response to the demands of  the bilingual state, the right to translation of  proceedings where
the accused does not speak the language of  the proceedings is a fundamental human right
and a basic tenet of  a fair trial as protected by Article 6 ECHR.81 Translating the evidence
of  witnesses or accused persons for the benefit of  a tribunal that does not speak their
language, and vice versa, is the best and only solution in most cases where the accused or
witness is either a foreign national or is a member of  an ethnic minority with poor
command of  the official language. But it is not the perfect scenario, as it is not merely
poetry that is lost in translation. Not only is factual error, or at least a lack of  nuanced
interpretation, a potential risk, more crucially, the translator becomes the voice of  the
evidence. The tribunal therefore hears and focuses on the simultaneous translation heard
through earphones and misses the subtle tell-tale signs and signals of  veracity, or lack of  it,
that can only be gained by listening to evidence at first-hand.82
The right to use Irish in court proceedings is the only right granted to Irish speakers by
the Act, and, in this respect, is similar to the Welsh Language Acts of  1967 and 1993 which
granted the right to use the Welsh language in court proceedings, but no other legal right.83
Despite its long-standing status as the official language of  a member state, it was only as
recently as 1 January 2007, upon the instigation of  the Republic of  Ireland, that Irish
acquired the status of  an official and working language of  the EU. This, arguably, is further
proof  of  Irish political ambivalence towards the Irish language. 
Bilingual juries in Ireland
The jury as an institution was imported to Ireland in the middle ages, and by the seventeenth
century had all but supplanted alternative native legal customs and processes.84 After
independence, the common law system was largely preserved and the right to trial by jury,
except for minor offences, became a constitutional right in accordance with Article 38.5 of
the constitution. Traditionally in Ireland, as in England, the jury was a middle-class, male
and unrepresentative institution. The full democratisation of  jury service in Ireland
occurred more or less in tandem with England and Wales in the post-independence era.85
Prior to the Juries Act (Ireland) 1976, the position in Ireland was governed by the Juries
Act (Ireland) 1927 which based jury service eligibility rules on a property qualification and,
to all meaningful purposes, excluded women. Following the Irish Supreme Court’s ruling in
de Burca & Anderson v Attorney General,86 which declared the provisions of  the 1927 Act to
be unconstitutional, s 6 of  the Juries Act 1976 was enacted. This created a position
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analogous to that which had been established a few years earlier in England and Wales, by
virtue of  the Juries Act (UK) of  1974, whereby virtually all adults between 18 and 70 years
of  age would be eligible for jury service. 
The emergence of  the belief  in jury representativeness also engendered judicial support
for the mechanism of  random selection from the general population.87 In de Burca v the
Attorney General, Henchy J encapsulated this growing judicial enthusiasm for random
selection from a representative cross-section of  society:
the jury must be drawn from a pool broadly representative of  the community so
that its verdict will be stamped with the fairness and acceptability of  a genuinely
diffused community decision . . . it is left to the discretion of  the legislature to
formulate a system for the compilation of  jury lists and panels from which will
be recruited juries which will be competent, impartial and representative.88
That juries should in principle be representative, include women and be drawn from a broad
cross-section of  society is uncontroversial. But Ireland’s bilingual status also calls for juries
who can function through both official languages. The judgment in de Burca would prove
decisive in the deliberations in Ó Maicín, where, by a majority of  four to one, the Supreme
Court held that the defendant was not entitled to be tried by a jury who spoke Irish.89 All
the judges were in agreement that the case turned on the question of  language rights, the
fundamental issue being the nature and parameters of  those rights in criminal
proceedings.90 But the Supreme Court, by a majority, concluded that, ‘the appellant’s
constitutional right to conduct official business in Irish had to give way to the constitutional
obligation for jury panels to be truly representative’.91
In Ó Maicín, the prosecution had argued that summoning a bilingual jury, that is, a body
of  people with sufficient skills to be able to hear and determine evidence in Irish without
an interpreter, would be practically difficult if  not impossible, and creating a linguistic test
would be unconstitutional as it would interfere with the principle that a jury should be
randomly selected from the community in general. At the judicial review proceedings, the
High Court ruled that jury selection by linguistic ability, albeit restricted to the official
languages of  the state, would not accord with the provisions of  s 11 of  the Juries Act
197692 and Article 38 of  the constitution.93 The High Court held that the summoning of
an Irish-speaking jury would call for unlawful and unconstitutional interference with the
principle of  random selection from the district population as whole.94 It also held that the
provisions of  s 44 of  the Courts of  Justice Act 1924, which requires judges assigned to
Irish-speaking circuits to have sufficient knowledge of  Irish to be able to preside without
an interpreter, did not extend to the jury.95
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But the principal authority relied upon was the previous Supreme Court authority of
Mac Cárthaigh.96 In that case, the defendant was tried for robbery and wished to conduct his
defence through the medium of  the Irish language, relying upon the constitutional status of
the language. The alleged offence and subsequent trial took place in Dublin. The
prosecution argued that Article 38.5 of  the constitution meant that to selectively summon
an Irish-speaking jury would offend the principles of  jury representativeness and random
selection. The Supreme Court agreed and held that to make fluency in Irish a requirement
for jury service would seriously compromise the representative character of  the jury and
would therefore be unconstitutional. It held that the need to select jurors randomly from
the entire community triumphed over the Irish speaker’s purported claim to a right to a
tribunal that spoke his language. The Supreme Court referred to a number of  authorities
which emphasised the importance of  the jury being drawn from and being representative
of  the entire community, including de Burca & Anderson v Attorney General.97
In Mac Cárthaigh, the alleged impracticality of  summoning a jury with the ability to
understand legal argument and court proceedings in Irish was considered.98 The capacity
within the general population to comprehend evidence and legal direction in the Irish
language would also be a matter of  debate in Ó Maicín, and this is something to which we
shall return shortly. But the Mac Cárthaigh ruling was criticised for being at odds with the
constitutional position of  the Irish language as the first official language of  the state.99 It
should be noted that the third section of  Article 8, which states that ‘provision may,
however, be made by law for the exclusive use of  either of  the said languages for any one or
more official purposes’ (emphasis added), was not relied upon. Article 8.3 of  the
constitution makes clear that the departure from the primary position of  Irish being the
first official language requires legal provision and there is nothing explicit in the Juries Act
(Ireland) 1976 permitting such a departure. 
The Law Reform Commission in Ireland in its consultation paper on juries, published
in March 2010, also gave Mac Cárthaigh some consideration.100 Among the topics
considered was the argument for bilingual juries and the Law Reform Commission stated
that it:
concurs with the approach taken in the Mac Cárthaigh case and considers that it
would not be desirable to make provision for all-Irish juries. The Commission
considers that confidence in the jury system is best preserved through selecting
jurors for all cases from a broad cross-section of  the community, including cases
where a defendant would prefer an Irish speaking jury. The Commission is also
conscious that there would be significant administrative difficulties in selecting a
panel of  jurors competent in the Irish language particularly in cases being tried
outside Irish speaking areas. Additionally, the Commission considers that it is
important that persons other than the defendant should be able to comprehend
the proceedings in court.101
The final report that was later published added nothing to this initial finding.102 In Ó Maicín,
the binding stare decisis significance of  the earlier judgment in Mac Cárthaigh was considered.
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It was recognised that the position of  the Irish language in Galway is radically different to
that of  Dublin and that this could provide a basis for valid factual distinction. However, the
majority held that the judgment in Mac Cárthaigh was to be followed.
The majority acknowledged that the appellant, in principle, enjoyed a constitutional right
to conduct official business fully in Irish. However, that principle was not absolute and in
some circumstances had to give way to other considerations. It was held that it would
neither be possible nor constitutional to create an Irish-speaking jury district on a
geographical basis nor to draw up a list of  Irish-speaking citizens capable of  serving on a
jury by some other mechanism.103 As with the judges in Mac Cárthaigh, demographic
considerations weighed heavily on judicial reasoning in Ó Maicín. It was said that the weak
currency of  the Irish language meant that it would be very difficult to raise a jury with the
requisite linguistic skills to try a case in Irish without the help of  an interpreter or
translator.104 The level of  competency required for the task simply could not be determined
with any degree of  accuracy.105
With this perceived danger that the pool of  eligible jurors could be smaller than the
official figures suggest, the challenge of  ensuring impartiality and independence when a jury
is summoned from a more selective pool of  citizens was also noted.106 Perhaps this, rather
briefly mentioned point, reveals more about the anxieties of  the non-Irish-speaking
population and their perceptions and preconceptions of  speakers of  the language than any
of  the other more thoroughly rehearsed arguments. However, these anxieties about the
linguistic competence and strength in numbers and, consequently, potential impartiality of
the Irish-speaking population did not accord with the expert evidence heard and
unchallenged by the court.107 That expert evidence stated that, in the Connemara Gaeltacht,
67 per cent of  a population of  13,444 speak Irish on a daily basis and that, in some areas,
some 85–90 per cent of  the people speak Irish to a standard that enables them to
understand legal matters. Accordingly, 12 people chosen at random from an Irish-speaking
population of  about 10,000 in the district where the alleged offence in Ó Maicín was
committed would have both the competence and independence to try a defendant in Irish
without an interpreter. 
Clarke J, unpersuaded by this evidence and its support for creating a bilingual jury
district in the Connemara Gaeltacht, also introduced a further objection to bilingual juries.
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He claimed a need to strike a balance between the rights of  Irish speakers to use their
language in their dealings with the state and the rights of  others to use English, which is
also an official language. In other words, the judge discovered a social tension in Irish
language policy which could give rise to a conflict of  rights unless kept in check. His view
was that promoting Irish language rights might lead to the diminishing of  English language
rights:108
While the State, and each of  its organs, has an obligation to promote and respect
the high status of  the Irish language there may, nonetheless, be limitations on an
entitlement to have Irish used which derive from the limited use of  Irish in
ordinary everyday life at least so far as many parts of  the country is concerned.
Other citizens are entitled to use English as an official language if  they wish and
their rights so to do must also be respected.109
This reasoning, described as a false antithesis by Hardiman J, who delivered the sole
dissenting judgment which I shall turn to later in this article,110 appears to present us with
a linguistic zero-sum principle. It is reasoning which appears to say that granting the right
to a bilingual jury to an Irish-speaking defendant would lead to an injustice, that is, the
exclusion of  a significant proportion of  the population who do not speak Irish from the
opportunity to be randomly selected to serve on the jury panel in that particular trial (no
matter how infrequently a request for an Irish-speaking jury might arise in reality). That is
the only injustice that is discernible, as the citizen who might wish to use English in a
criminal trial before a bilingual jury in Ireland could do so without resort to an interpreter
or translator as there are very few monolingual Irish speakers remaining in any part of  the
country. Furthermore, such injustices must be committed on a weekly basis throughout
Canada to monolingual English or French speakers who are denied the remote chance to
serve on juries in trials where the defendant’s official language is French or English. This,
however, was something which the majority of  the judges in Ó Maicín refrained from
contemplating. 
In accordance with the precedent laid down in Mac Cárthaigh, it was further held that, as
juries should be representative of  the entire community, they should also be randomly
selected and no interference with that principle could be supported.111 Does this assume
that the Irish-speaking population is not in other respects representative of  the Irish
population in general? There is good evidence which suggests that Irish speakers share the
same demographic balance as non-Irish speakers in terms of  gender and age.112 Somehow,
these facts, which temper concerns about representativeness and which provide perspective
and proportionality to the debate, were overlooked or ignored. This only reinforces the view
that the judgment of  the majority of  the judges in Ó Maicín was driven more by ideology
than evidence. 
As for Ireland’s purported bilingualism, Clarke J, reflecting upon the state’s
responsibilities towards the Irish language, concluded that, ‘there is a clear constitutional
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obligation on the State to encourage the use of  Irish for official business’.113 Indeed, the
obligation to encourage is repeated: ‘it does not seem to me that the general obligation of
the State can, therefore, be put any higher than an obligation to encourage’.114 This
interpretation of  the State’s obligation towards the Irish language did not go unchallenged.
Even MacMenamin J, who concurred with Clarke J on the unconstitutionality of  bilingual
juries, and who concluded that the decision in Mac Cárthaigh should be followed,115
nevertheless felt that ‘the duty of  the State goes further than merely to seek to encourage
the status of  the first national language’.116
But it was Hardiman J who took issue with this point most vehemently and attacked the
false antithesis which claimed that granting Irish speakers the same right as English speakers
to be tried by a tribunal who spoke their language would somehow undermine the rights of
English speakers. He also robustly rejected the claim that the state had no more than ‘an
obligation to encourage’ and condemned it as an attempt to dilute the constitutional
position of  Irish in breach of  the proper function of  the Supreme Court to uphold the
constitution.117 Hardiman J held that the appellant had a constitutional right to be tried
before a jury who could understand Irish without the assistance of  an interpreter. In both
tone and content, Hardiman J’s judgment is one of  the most remarkable dissenting
judgments in the history of  Irish law: I would suggest that every member of  the Oireachtas
should read it. 
For Hardiman J the crucial fact was that Ireland had been officially a bilingual country
since independence and, accordingly, this had implications for the state’s treatment of  the
language in conducting official business, including the business of  the courts:
The effect of  Article 8 of  the Constitution is to establish Ireland as a bilingual
State in terms of  the Constitution and the laws. It is a historical truism that
official Ireland has always been reluctant to behave as if  the State were indeed,
in law and in practice as well as in constitutional theory, a bilingual State. But that
does not take from the fact that Ireland is, by its Constitution, a bilingual State.
The Judges, of  course, are bound to uphold the Constitution.118
Hardiman J also declared that he did not believe that there was any other country in the
world in which a citizen would not be entitled to defend himself  or herself  before a court
in the national and first official language and to be understood directly in that language.119
The expeditious solution he proposed was that the relevant government minister should
exercise a statutory power to order a bilingual jury district and that the Connemara Gaeltacht
could be declared a jury district from which a bilingual jury could be summoned. 
In Ó Maicín, a technical point was also identified and which may yet prove highly
significant to the future discussion of  this issue. The trial judge had refused the defendant’s
application for a bilingual jury on the basis that he did not have the power to investigate the
competency in Irish of  potential jurors as there is no statutory provision enabling him to
carry out such an enquiry.120 In the Law of  England and Wales, the provisions of  s 10 of
the Juries Act 1974 enable the courts to disqualify any juror who cannot speak English. All
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jurors in criminal trials in England and Wales must be linguistically competent, meaning they
must understand English. In Ireland, however, the Juries Act 1976 is silent on a potential
juror’s language skills. Section 6 makes all citizens over 18 and under 70 years of  age, and
whose names appear on the electoral register, eligible to serve on a jury: however, no
language competence is set out.121
Is this silence by accident or by design? A more cynical view would be that this was a
calculated political sleight of  hand, one designed to avoid the language issue altogether and
thus allow the courts to circumvent the constitutional status of  Irish. That the Irish Law
Reform Commission’s otherwise comprehensive and detailed report on jury service was
virtually silent on the significance of  Ireland’s bilingualism would tend to reinforce this
suspicion.122 Indeed, even among scholars with an interest in jury composition and jury
representativeness in Ireland, the language issue is often ignored.123 It leads the external
observer to the conclusion that language policy in Ireland is politically a thorny if  not
unmentionable issue. 
But the plot thickens. Despite there being no statutory language test for jury service, it
came to light during the proceedings that court staff  and county registrars responsible for
summoning jurors do identify and exclude persons unable to communicate in English. Such
persons are often economic migrants and other immigrants from the EU or further afield.
However, this ad hoc administrative practice has no statutory basis. O’Neil J valiantly sought
to find some legal basis for this administrative practice124 and suggested that s 9(2) of  the
Juries Act 1976 might offer that basis. That section gives a county registrar the power to
excuse any person from jury service if  that person shows that there is good reason why he
or she should be so excused. However, regrettably, the learned judge failed to distinguish
between eligibility and excusal: to excuse an individual from jury service on a particular
occasion due to personal circumstances, such as financial hardship or poor health, is
obviously not the same as saying that an individual is ineligible for jury service. Whereas the
former may appropriately fall within the province of  a bureaucratic decision, the latter
cannot as a matter of  due process: the magnitude of  such a decision requires legal authority
more than that which can be provided by administrative action. His response to the
corollary that if  the provision could be used to justify the exclusion of  non-English
speakers, so it could also exclude non-Irish speakers if  the circumstances of  the case so
required, was simply that it would be ‘a breach of  the cross community representation
principle enjoined by Article 38’.125
Hardiman J, conversely, believed that the practice of  court administrators weeding out
non-English speakers was without proper legal basis and required urgent legislative
attention.126 That, surely, is the correct legal position. Addressing that specific matter may
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yet offer the path to proper democratic scrutiny and open public debate on the state’s
language policy in the context of  criminal jury trials.127
Setting a precedent?
It is, I suspect, unnecessary to draw out the obvious distinctions between Canada and
Ireland on the issue of  bilingual juries. But the judgments in Ó Maicín also reflect internally
divided opinions on the issue. Their heated and passionate tone, and especially that of  the
dissenting judge, betray deeply held and discordant views on the proper place of  the Irish
language in Irish society. The stark contrast with Canada is that there upholding linguistic
equality and honouring the principle of  bilingualism take precedent over arguments about
jury representativeness. In addition, judicial opinion on the proper role of  the state in
maintaining bilingualism marks a point of  divergence between Canada and Ireland. For the
majority in the Irish Supreme Court in Ó Maicín, a ‘duty to encourage’ seemed adequate. In
Canada, conversely, the law states that the state has duties in ‘enhancing the vitality and
supporting the development of  English and French linguistic minority communities’ and
‘fostering full recognition and use of  English and French in Canadian society’.128 The latter
represents true commitment to bilingualism. The former does not. 
If  the ruling in Ó Maicín means that Ireland has declined to follow the Canadian model
and precedent, it is also the case that it may have set a precedent. Across the water from
Dublin, the case for bilingual juries has also been exercising minds. Indeed, as long ago as
the 1930s, the legal status of  the Welsh language was a matter of  public debate and gave
rise to a national petition calling for rights for Welsh speakers in courts and public
administration.129 The petition, among other things, called for the right to use the Welsh
language in legal proceeding and mechanisms to decide whether Welsh or English shall be
the language of  any particular trial.130 It also called for Welsh-speaking jurors where
evidence is given through the medium of  Welsh in the cause of  justice and evidential
accuracy.131 The twentieth century would see the enactment of  legislation that would
promote equality between Welsh and English and guarantee the right to use the Welsh
language in legal, including criminal, proceedings.132 However, that legislative reform did
not also create the right to a tribunal which understands the Welsh language. 
In Wales, the debate often focused on trial fairness and efficiency in the administration
of  criminal justice.133 Advocates of  bilingual juries wished Welsh and English to be treated
equally in public life and in the courts of  Wales. But they also based their case on the alleged
advantages to the criminal justice process if  jurors understood the evidence without having
to rely on an interpreter.134 In recent times, the comprehensive review of  the criminal
courts in England and Wales, chaired by Sir Robin Auld, provided a further opportunity to
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examine the subject: he recommended that it should be the subject of  consultation and
discussion in Wales.135
Not only were there arguments in favour of  bilingual juries, but also objections to such
a development. The objections mirrored those heard in Ireland, those being that the
language is spoken by a minority of  the population and so to summon bilingual juries would
unreasonably limit the pool of  eligible jurors, even to the extent that they would not be
representative of  the entire community.136 The legal community in Wales considered the
merits of  bilingual juries in a bilingual country.137 Officialdom also responded when the
Office for Criminal Justice Reform in England and Wales published a consultation paper on
the use of  bilingual juries (Welsh and English) in some criminal trials in Wales, which
outlined the principal arguments for and against bilingual juries.138
The government was slow to report its findings on the consultation paper and one
member of  Parliament strove to stimulate the discussion by presenting a private Bill to
revise the law in favour of  bilingual juries. Not surprisingly, his efforts were frustrated by
the parliamentary machine.139 Then, in early 2010, the Ministry of  Justice finally published
its official response to the consultation.140 Of  the 24 responses that were received from
organisations and individuals the majority of  respondents were in favour of  bilingual juries.
However, the government’s unfavourable response was not unexpected. 
The government considered that the overriding question was the case for bilingual juries
in principle.141 The report addressed that question by reflecting on the significance of  jury
representativeness and random selection’s part in the process and found that ‘much of  the
authority of, and widespread public confidence in, the jury system derives from its socially
inclusive nature’.142 The report identified the chief  barriers to bilingual juries in Wales as
being the interference with random selection and jury representativeness.143 There was
nothing unexpected in this response. Indeed, it simply reiterated the well-rehearsed
arguments against bilingual juries. What it failed to do was fully to consider the impact and
significance of  the bilingual national policy on the issue. 
The report also relied upon research commissioned by the Ministry of  Justice and
carried out at University College London on the jury system in England and Wales, focusing
particularly on the representative element within the jury.144 This was, without doubt,
substantial research into various aspects of  the subject and its relevance to the jury as an
institution. However, the consideration of  the linguistic situation in Wales was cursory and
sparse. Jurors’ linguistic skills in courts in Wales were reviewed over a period of  a week and
on that basis it was found that only a small minority of  potential jurors considered
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themselves to be fluent in Welsh. Indeed, it was claimed that only 6.4 per cent of  those who
were summoned to serve on a jury were fluent in Welsh, leading to this conclusion: ‘such a
low level of  Welsh fluency among serving jurors indicates that conducting jury trials with a
full bilingual jury would be difficult to achieve, certainly on any regular basis’.145
Of  course, this figure of  6.4 per cent does not correspond with the figures in the 2011
census which state that around 20 per cent of  the population can speak the language.146
The report did not explain how the data was collected (or what questions the prospective
jurors were asked), although the authors speculated that respondents in Wales may have
flinched at the possibility of  having to perform such an onerous public duty as jury service
in Welsh.147 Such speculation, based on the sample of  a week’s survey, is methodologically
inadequate and renders any conclusion unreliable. Even more irresponsible is the
government’s reliance on this evidence in its response to the call for bilingual juries. Indeed,
the government’s report engages in socio-linguistic hypothesises that the bilingual skills of
the Welsh-speaking population are unlikely to be sufficiently robust to cope without the
assistance of  the professional interpreter.148
But whatever doubts we may have about the soundness of  these findings, the
government cannot be criticised for taking cognisance of  the Irish position on bilingual
juries. With the judgment in Mac Cárthaigh readily to hand, the authors of  the report held
up the Irish precedent as a model of  good judgment: 
The country where the linguistic position is probably most closely analogous
with the position in Wales is the Republic of  Ireland. The Government notes that
the Irish Supreme Court . . . has decided that there is no right under the Irish
constitution to be tried by an Irish-speaking jury. The judgment was based mainly
on random selection arguments. This judgment is particularly striking in that
Irish has a formal constitutional position as the first language of  the Republic of
Ireland, and English as second language, rather than Irish and English being
regarded broadly as equals as Welsh and English are in Wales.149
The government report was deficient in a number of  respects. Although there was generous
acknowledgment of  and support for the Irish example, there was no mention of  the
alternative Canadian model. Ireland’s concept of  bilingual justice and the Irish Supreme
Court’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of  granting Irish speakers the right to be tried by
a jury that speak their official language gave the British government the perfect excuse to
dismiss the claims of  Welsh speakers. The reasoning was simple. If  a sovereign state which
claims that its national language is the first official language refuses the right to be tried by
a jury that speak that official language, why should we recognise such a right in Wales? That
the Irish courts could have offered the British government such a justification on a plate
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should be the source of  discomfort in Ireland. Left unaddressed, this is a subject that has
the potential to become another ‘sordid’ chapter in the history of  the Irish language.150
Conclusion
In less than a decade, Ireland will be marking the centenary of  its independence as a nation.
It will be an opportunity for the nation to reflect on its journey thus far and to ponder over
its future direction. Ireland has changed and will continue to do so. On 22 May 2015, the
Irish people, in a plebiscite, approved changing the state’s constitution to extend civil
marriage rights to same-sex couples.151 This would have been unthinkable a generation ago.
Yet the Irish people’s capacity for generosity and fairness and their willingness to embrace
change in the interests of  justice should not be underestimated.
The creation of  the Irish state as a bilingual state was also an act of  justice and a
deliberate renunciation of  a colonial past when the Irish language was demeaned, routinely
mocked and excluded from the courts of  justice. Yet, the issue of  bilingual juries betrays
the Irish state’s neurosis about its bilingualism. It is a bilingual state which fails to ensure
equality to both its official languages in the administration of  justice. Because of  this, the
Irish speaker in the criminal courts of  the Republic of  Ireland is in no significantly better
position than his or her counterpart in Northern Ireland. 
Some may respond to this paper by claiming that it amounts to condemning the Irish
state’s bilingualism on the basis of  a single issue. The reply is that, firstly, to be tried by a
court of  justice in your official language and by a tribunal which understands your official
language is the hallmark or the litmus paper indicator of  true state bilingualism. It is a right
and privilege that only sovereign people in their sovereign state can expect to enjoy. It is the
right which distinguishes the status of  Welsh or Irish in the UK from French and English
in Canada or Finnish and Swedish in Finland. Secondly, this issue is indicative of  a deeper
malaise within the Irish state with regard to its national and first official language. It is a
malaise that in recent years resulted in an Irish Language Commissioner resigning in despair
and thousands of  people taking to the streets of  Dublin to protest at the treatment of  the
Irish language by governments in both the republic and the north.152
Aggravating Ireland’s failure to behave and set an example as a bilingual state is that it
has established an unfortunate precedent for another linguistic community which currently
lacks the political and democratic means to reject that precedent and adopt the Canadian
model. Wales, although proclaiming Welsh as an official language,153 and with a nascent
legislature of  its own to legislate for its future, must also function within the straightjacket
imposed by being part of  the unitary British state, the unified jurisdiction of  England and
Wales and in a context whereby power over criminal justice is not devolved. 
As for Ireland, it has the political and legal means to act. The immediate task is to
determine what ought to be the language test for jury service in the Juries Act 1976. Is it
seriously suggested that competence in English and only English can be the appropriate
qualification in this bilingual state? The palpably unlawful practice of  excluding non-English
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speakers by court administrators without any statutory or other lawful basis cannot continue
and it is a matter for Ireland’s legislature to address with urgency. 
This specific issue will unavoidably lead to the wider discussion on Ireland’s
bilingualism and the state’s response to the Irish Supreme Court’s interpretation of  the
constitution in the context of  bilingual juries. That debate should lead to one or two
outcomes. If  the Irish legislature agrees with the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ó Maicín,
it should put in motion processes to amend the Irish Constitution so that a new Article 8
is enacted in these terms:154
Article 8 (as amended)
1. The first official language of  the Republic of  Ireland is English.
2. The Irish language is also recognised as an official language. 
Such a formula would reflect the slightly inferior status of  Irish and would thus justify a
policy of  linguistic inequality. Of  course, it would be subjected to democratic scrutiny not
only in the Oireachtas but also by the people of  Ireland in a referendum.155 Who knows,
it might finally lay to rest any pretence the Irish state residually holds about being a
bilingual state.
There is, of  course, the alternative course. Ireland could renew its commitment to its
founders’ vision of  a bilingual state based on linguistic equality and the place to start would
be the subject of  bilingual juries. The Supreme Court having twice declared bilingual juries
to be unconstitutional, ensuring the constitutionality of  bilingual juries would require
changing that constitution. That change would need to be initiated by the body politic. The
required change might take the following form:
Article 38.7 (as amended)
A person to be tried on any criminal charge shall be tried before a judge, judges
or judge and jury who speak the official language of  Ireland that is the language
of  the person to be tried or, if  the circumstances warrant, who speak both
official languages of  Ireland.
Such a formula, in plain language, spells equality. Further supplementary amendments to the
Juries Act 1976 to deal with the mechanics of  drawing up lists of  bilingual citizens from
which potential jurors would be summoned should cause little difficulty: there are ample
precedents in Canada. 
Having been the subject of  repeated judicial scrutiny, perhaps it is high time that this
matter is subjected to democratic scrutiny. Is it not time for the Irish people to decide the
sort of  bilingual state theirs should be? 
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